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Academic faculties, country clubs, social networks, as well as internet clubs, share one com-
mon characteristic: they are status organizations. The interaction among the members of
these organizations increases the utility for the individual member. The value of interaction
depends on the status of the individual member. The higher the status of an individual
member is (for instance, in an academic faculty the ability to publish high-quality research)
the more valuable this member is for others. Status is a vertically dierentiable good, char-
acterized by some degree of rivalry. The larger the number of members that interact with
one person, the less valuable this interaction becomes individually.
As a matter of precision, we focus on one important application of the status organi-
zations framework, hiring decisions in academic faculties. Hiring decisions are crucial in
faculties (more than in many other industries) because successful research is highly depen-
dent on human capital. Although as researchers we experience and participate in hiring
decisions frequently, a theoretical framework that takes into account the specics of individ-
ual collaboration between highly skilled workers is missing.
We concentrate on two sets of questions. First, what are the implications of competition
among faculties for the allocation of new members and the distribution of the resulting
surplus? For instance, will top PhDs join the best or just second tier universities and for what
wage? Second, what is the impact of alternative governance structures on the competitive
outcome and who benets from a certain decision-making rule in a certain faculty? For
example, should all members of one faculty get veto rights or is it better to grant decision
rights to the highest ranking faculty member? Why? Is the answer to this question important
for the other faculty or the candidate?
We will show that the job candidates (researchers) with highest status levels join the club
with the highest average status. Candidates with lower status levels either join the club with
a low average status or are not accepted by any club at all. New faculty members with low
status levels are unable to appropriate any surplus from joining a faculty. In contrast, new
members with high status are protected by the competition that arises amongst the clubs
and are thereby able to share the surplus with existing faculty members.
The answer to our second research question is that the aggregate surplus of a faculty
is maximized if a decision-making rule is employed that makes the average faculty member
pivotal. This is due to positive and negative externalities that make decisions by members
with more extreme preferences, such as the lowest ranking or the highest ranking member,
detrimental to the utility of most of their fellows. Consequently, governance structures that
allow every member to veto a hiring decision or that assign decision rights to the most
reputable member of a faculty are clearly dominated.
As in practice information asymmetries and transaction costs may make it a non-trivial
1task to nd a governance structure that makes the average member pivotal, we argue that
majority voting is a second-best alternative for many faculties. The reason is that, as long
as the status frequency distribution in a faculty is not too skewed, the median member's
preferences, who is made pivotal under majority voting, are not too far from the average
member's. This nding translates to our main policy implication. Faculties that are governed
by consensus (such as many in Europe) could improve the well-being of their members if
they liberalized their internal decision making processes, that is if they moved more into the
direction of majority voting.
We model competition among faculties for candidates in a two-faculty framework. The
two faculties with a given number of existing members with given status levels dier in their
average status levels. A high average status faculty (e.g. Harvard University) competes
with a faculty with lower average status level (e.g. State University X). Existing members
trade o the utility they receive via the average status level of the other members of their
faculty, which has implications for the success of joint research projects, against the reduction
in teaching load that can be bought if no new member enters the faculty. We show that
faculty members with low status benet more from joint research than members with high
status. This advantage is diluted more than proportional by entry of new members with low
status. Hence, we nd somewhat surprisingly that low status members are more restrictive
in allowing candidates to enter the faculty if they are pivotal.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide an overview of the
related literature. In section 3, we outline the baseline model and look into the competition
between two faculties in the presence of majority voting. In section 4, we characterize the
equilibrium in this setup. In section 5, we analyze the allocation of surplus and introduce
the generalized pivotal member model. In section 6, we discuss robustness of our main
assumptions, whereas in section 7 we conclude and derive several testable hypotheses.
2 Related Literature
In order to place our approach relative to the existing literature we stress upfront the key
properties and the main distinguishing features of our model relative to the existing liter-
ature. They are as follows. (i): Status is a one-dimensional, vertically dierentiable type
variable. Hence the relative preference ordering of access to a candidate among existing
members, and vice versa, is equal. All players are exogenously endowed with status, i.e.
we do not allow them to invest in status. (ii): Making use of the status of a fellow faculty
member, however, incurs a cost (for the remaining faculty members) because it dilutes the
value of interaction with this fellow, which makes using status a rival good. (iii): The actual
payo created by using all faculty members' status, however, diers among individuals be-
cause, from the perspective of a lowly ranked member, the average status value of his fellows
2is higher than from the perspective of a highly ranked member. (iv): The status utility of
faculty members is not perfectly transferable as we consider a friction between the payment
of money and the consumption of perks.
We can identify several dierent branches of literature related to our work. First, the
seminal works on the economic theory of clubs were published in the 1960s. Most notably,
Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965) initiated a wave of research on the economic theory of
clubs and club goods, which was to be further developed in the decades following (see Sandler
and Tschirhart (1980) and Cornes and Sandler (1996, ch. 11)). As in Ellickson et al. (1999),
we deal with the individual characteristics of new and incumbent faculty members and the
interrelation of a faculty's aggregate characteristics and its competition for new candidates.
In contrast to those authors, we do not explicitly calculate the optimal size of faculties but
equilibrium levels of wages paid to for new candidates. Helsley and Strange (1991) too,
compare discriminating pricing schemes but our paper, furthermore, endogenizes faculties'
governance structure.
A second strand of the literature covers the dynamic aspects of clubs' decision making
rules and admission of new members. Sobel (2001) focuses on multidimensional character-
istics and heterogeneous preferences of members showing the circumstances under which
status level thresholds that have to be met by candidates increase or decrease over time.
Barbera et al. (2001) and Cai and Feng (2004) oer related approaches analyzing the eects
of various interest groups within a club on entrance of new members in equilibrium. Apart
from the fact that we do not model dynamic aspects explicitly, our model contrasts with
respect to characteristics (i) and partly (iii).
Third, our paper builds on the idea of clubs as status organizations being introduced by
Hansmann (1986, 1996) who refers to \clubs" as a \prototypical example of status organiza-
tions". Hansmann (1986), however, regards the formation of a club system while we assume
that clubs already exist.
The papers most closely related to ours are Epple and Romano (1998, 2002) who analyze
the competition among private and public schools for pupils in a world where peer eects
make school quality dependent on the ability composition of a school's student body. Epple
and Romano (1998) show that the competition of tax-nanced public schools and prot-
maximizing private schools leads the latter to skim o the wealthiest and most able students.
We dier signicantly by looking at competition among faculties that have similar objective
functions and where faculty decisions are determined by existing members rather than a
prot-maximizing investor.
Our paper is also closely related to the empirical investigations of governance structures
in universities. By looking into the functions and limitations of democatric governance struc-
tures in US universities, Masten (2006) shows that democratic decision-making processes are
hindered by neither the size of the organization nor the heterogeneity of its voting members.
3Rather, he nds that large universities with heterogenous departments have more democratic
structures in place than small, homogeneous colleges. Against this background he looks into
the function of such democratic processes. We complement his analysis to a certain extent.
Rather than focussing on democratic decision processes per se, we look into the implications
of dierent (democratic) governance structures. Thereby, we focus on the input market: the
decision of universities and faculties to hire new faculty members.
3 The Model
We model two academic faculties, j 2 fA;Bg, which compete for a new researcher. Individ-
uals are, with the exception of their status position, identical. The status position describes
their relative value for fellow scholars in social exchange processes and can be attributed
to a wide set of characteristics such as methodological and writing skills as well as network
relations.
Status positions of existing members are drawn from a distribution over the interval
[s;  s]. Faculty A (B) has NA (NB) existing members, where Nj is a nite number. Faculty j's
(j = A;B) member with highest status is called  nj, its member with lowest status is nj, and
its member with median status is mj (see details below). Furthermore, we dene member
Pj of faculty j as the pivotal member of faculty j who is decisive given a certain governance
structure or decision making rule which applies equally in both faculties. In the main body
of the paper we apply a majority voting rule and thereby equate the pivotal member with
the member with median status. We denote the aggregate status of all existing members




B si), where si is the status of member i. We assume that
setup costs are suciently high such that it is prohibitive for a subset of members (or new
candidates) to form a third faculty.
Each faculty has access to a given total budget for hiring of new researchers and lecturers,
 B, which it is assigned exogenously by its university's executive board. To focus on the
impact of status dierences on the competitive outcome, we assume that the hiring budget
in both faculties is equal. There are two alternative uses of the nancial endowment of
faculty j. First, it can hire pure teaching sta (who have no voting rights in the faculty)
on a perfectly competitive labor market. In exchange, they take some teaching burden o
the existing faculty members, which is worth   B=Nj to each member, where  < 1. This
assumption depicts the notion that, due to rules imposed by the governing body of the
university (the state or a private endowment or institution), it is not feasible for existing
members to hire and pay themselves for additional teaching and consume nancial resources
without discounting. The second alternative use of faculty j's nancial endowment is to hire
a new researcher (candidate C) and oer him a wage Wj. The remaining budget of  B   Wj
4is used for hiring pure teaching sta.1
By means of collaboration and social exchange, faculty members can increase their re-
search output and, hence, their well-being. This eect hinges on the average status of the
other faculty members, where status is a rival good: each member has a xed amount of
resources (time) to interact with his fellows. If the number of fellows increases, interaction
with a given fellow decreases on average. This interpretation of the status variable, as rival
good, is dierent from status being equal to reputation, a non-rival good. However, our for-
mal representation of (average) status being the argument in the member's utility function
is also in line with status as a partially non-rival good: if the status of a faculty member
creates utility both via reputation (non-rival) and via interaction and exchange (rival), we
only need to assume that both aspects are superior in one faculty as compared to another.
Even if status utility only stemmed from reputation, our framework would be appropriate
under the notion that the reputation of a faculty is the more pronounced the higher is the
average status of its members. Henceforth, however, we focus on the rival aspect of status.
Support follows a random exchange among faculty members. Therefore, in expectation,
each member gains an equal share of a fellow's support. Cooperation is more productive and
valuable for each member, the higher the social status of the counterpart. Hence, we depict
the utility function of a particular existing member k of faculty j as:2
U
k
j = ^ s
k
j + (




j denotes the average status of all the other members in faculty j from the point
of view of faculty member k. Our linearity assumption does not put any particular weight
on either of the two arguments of the utility function: the utility gained from joint research
(average status of fellow members) and from teaching load reduction (budget left over for
hiring new teaching sta) are perfect substitutes. The marginal rate of substitution between
status and money is constant for all players and, hence, independent of a member's own
status. The introduction of  relaxes the assumption of status and money being perfect
substitutes. Note that any friction in the model that could be reached by assuming concave
utility of status or convex operating costs (with respect to the number of faculty members)
can be reinterpreted with reference to  < 1 but with signicantly less calculus.
Before we introduce the new candidate, let us briey spell out some notation. For member
1An alternative interpretation is that a functioning faculty, which allows for productive cooperation among
the faculty members, requires nancial resources in order to cover operating costs, pay for travel costs for
conferences etc. Here,  B is the faculty's total budget for these purposes, and Wj is the wage of a new
member.
2Subscripts denote faculties, and superscripts denote individuals.





A si   sk
NA   1
; (2)





B si   sk
NB   1
: (3)
We assume that faculty A is the more exclusive faculty. That is, the average status in
faculty A as well as the status utility enjoyed by the (identical) pivotal member is higher









 ^ sB and ^ s
P
A > ^ s
P
B: (4)
We assume all existing faculty members to be immobile because of switching costs. In
contrast, the candidates, newly graduated Ph.D.s, for instance, are mobile and can choose to
apply at any of the two faculties.3 A candidate who is accepted as new member of a faculty
aects both arguments of the utility function of the existing faculty members. First, the
new candidate, with status value sC, changes the average status value enjoyed by member k





A si   sk + sC
NA
; (5)





B si   sk + sC
NB
: (6)
If candidate C is admitted to a faculty, he also gains via interaction with the other
members. Furthermore, he receives a wage Wj in faculty j. However, by joining a particular
faculty, a new member foregoes opportunity costs, denoted by R, which he could gain from
working in another, non-academic profession.4 As the average status of j's members from
the perspective of a new member equals the average status of the existing members, ^ sj, the
utility function of candidate C entering faculty j is:
U
C
j = ^ sj + Wj   R: (7)
Note that Wj is not discounted by  in the candidate's utility function because there are no
rules that prohibit him from spending the wage as he wishes. This is dierent for existing
faculty members and reects institutional rules in most universities.
3We will discuss this assumption further in section 6.
4The candidate's opportunity costs could be positively related to his status value, or not. We show in
section 6 that the quality of our results is unaected by this relation and, thus, model R as a constant.
6We model the competition among the two faculties for new entrants as a two-stage game.
In the rst stage, both faculties A and B simultaneously decide whether they are willing
to allow the candidate to enter at all, that is they choose a minimum status level, sj;min,
that the entrant must satisfy. They also make take-it-or-leave-it oers to the new candidate,
Wj. In the second stage, the new entrant chooses to join the faculty that provides him with
the highest nonnegative utility and accepts his entry. In both stages of the game, complete
information prevails. We solve this game by backward induction for a subgame-perfect
solution.
4 Majority voting in faculties
We start by focusing on the case in which majority voting in faculties prevails. Later on, we
will address other rules of decision making in faculties as well. The strict monotonicity of
the utility gains of the existing members from entry of the new member allows us to apply
the median voter theorem. This implies that the median faculty member is the one who
actually determines the decisions of the faculty. This characteristic can be shown as follows.
The utility dierential, that is the post-entry utility minus the pre-entry utility of the k-th


























C   ^ s
k
j   Wj); (8)
which is strictly increasing in sC and the rank of k within the faculty. Therefore we obtain:
Lemma 1 (Admission incentives) Existing faculty members with lower status rank gain
less (or lose more) from a candidate's entry than members with higher status rank. Thus,
the minimal status level of a new member required by an individual existing member k is
lower, the higher the status rank of this existing member.
Understanding this lemma is a key to the remainder of the results of this paper. The
lowest ranking existing member of faculty j, nj, without entry enjoys a gross status utility of
P
j si s(nj)




Between the two extremes, gains from joint research are monotonous. Upon entry of any
new member, the advantage of low ranking existing members over high ranking members
is diluted. Hence, nj suers more than proportionally from entry, which is expressed by
(8). The intuition behind this is that high status members gain relatively less from social
interaction than their fellow members with low status. An entrant who participates in social
interaction with the high status faculty fellows is therefore crowding out existing faculty
7members with low status levels. This crowding-out eect is less of concern for high status
level members because they benet relatively less from joint research anyway. Given that
all existing faculty members benet proportionally from the teaching load reduction (or
any other facilities bought with the budget remaining after hiring a new member), faculty
members with higher status levels are relatively more liberal than the ones with lower levels
when deciding about entry of new members. As increasing Nj mitigates this eect, our
analysis is best suited for faculties with a small number of members.
4.1 The candidate's decisions
In the nal stage of the game the entrant has to make two decisions: should he join a faculty
at all and, if so, which one? The candidate will be willing to join a faculty j if the utility
this option oers is positive:
^ sj + Wj   R  0: (9)
We will refer to this inequality as the participation constraint of the entrant in faculty j,
(PCj). It implies that the candidate is willing to enter j if, and only if, the expected gains
from interaction with the other faculty members and the wage oered are not lower than his
opportunity cost associated with entry.
Given that the entrant will join any faculty at all, he will choose the one that oers him
the highest net utility, meaning that he will prefer faculty j over faculty q if:
^ sj + Wj > ^ sq + Wq: (10)
If this inequality holds for the equality sign, we will call it the indierence condition (IC)
of the entrant. For matters of completeness we assume that, in this case, the candidate will
join faculty A. By using this assumption and rearranging (10), we know that faculty A will
attract the candidate if the wage it oers and the status lead it has over faculty B are not
smaller than the wage oered by B:
WA = WB   (^ sA   ^ sB): (11)
Given the anticipated behavior of the entrant, we will now address the optimal behavior
of the faculties.
4.2 The choices of the faculties
In the rst stage of the game, faculties A and B compete by simultaneously choosing a mini-
mum status level of the candidate (sj;min) and the wage rate (Wj), taking into consideration
the candidate's reaction.
8The decision problem of the pivotal median member of faculty j is to maximize the
utility dierential 
mj
j he will individually receive from entry of the candidate subject to the









^ sj + Wj   R  0













Note that the second side constraint may hold with equality for faculty A.
As a rst step towards characterizing the subgame-perfect equilibrium we analyze the
minimal status requirements of the respective faculties as a function of the wages oered.
Therefore, we use the indierence condition, which faculty A must ensure that it holds, and
solve 
mj
j = 0 for sC. This yields:5
sA;min(WB) =
P














B si   smB
NB   1
+ WB: (15)
For tractability, we rewrite (14) and (15) as:6
sA;min(WB) = ^ s
mA
A   (^ sA   ^ sB) + WB (16)
sB;min(WB) = ^ s
mB
B + WB: (17)
Since 
mj
j is strictly increasing in sC, this implies that faculty j will not make any
acceptable oer to candidates with sC < sj;min. Comparing the minimum status position
determined by the two faculties we nd:
sA;min   sB;min = ^ s
mA
A   ^ s
mB
B + (^ sB   ^ sA): (18)
Note that (18) is independent of the wages oered by the faculties. This characteristic
allows for a separate analysis of the faculties' choices of minimum status requirement and
5Henceforth, when writing sj;min we implicitly refer to sj;min(sP), where P is the pivotal existing faculty
member in the specic decision making process.
6Recall that ^ s
mj
j refers to the status utility enjoyed by the median member of faculty j, whereas ^ sj refers
to the average status of faculty j, which coincides with the status utility enjoyed by an entrant to j.
9wage oered. The rst dierence on the RHS of (18) reects the (positive) dierence in the
\willingness-to-accept" a certain candidate due to the impact on the ex-ante utility enjoyed
by the median member in faculty A compared to his counterpart in faculty B. In contrast, the
second term in (18) reects the \necessity-to-pay" for a new member by faculty A relative
to the one in faculty B. This dierence is negative because every new entrant gains relatively
more when entering faculty A rather than faculty B given the higher average status level in
faculty A. This implies that the new member is willing to accept a lower salary in faculty A
compared to the one in faculty B. The sign of the RHS of (18) depends, thus, on the relative
impact of the two eects.






^ sA ^ sB g. Then,
(i) With  < ~ , the more exclusive faculty A is only willing to accept entrants with a relatively
higher status level compared to faculty B. The required minimum status position of faculty B
is strictly lower than the one of faculty A (i.e. sA;min > sB;min8WB).
(ii) With   ~ , the required minimum status of faculty B is higher than the one of faculty
A, implying that faculty B is more restrictive (i.e. sA;min  sB;min8WB).
The second part of Lemma 2 emerges if and only if the status distributions of the two
faculties are asymmetrically skewed. If the dierence between median and average status
level in both faculties is the same (or smaller in A than in B), then ~  = 1, which implies
(because  is assumed to be strictly smaller than one) that only case (i) is feasible. With
all other status distributions, the second case becomes feasible but will only emerge if 
is suciently large. This only occurs if the reduction of teaching load is so valuable for
existing faculty members that they would rather pay the wage of additional teaching sta
completely out of their private pockets than to teach themselves. Given that the main focus
of our analysis is on faculties in which the social interaction among members that leads to
improved research outcomes plays an important role, this is not the point of interest in the
current paper. Therefore, we concentrate our analysis on case (i) of Lemma 2 only.7
Before we characterize the subgame-perfect equilibrium, let us dene the following wage
levels. The minimum salary a candidate might accept from faculty B is given by:
W
E
B  R   ^ sB:
The minimal competitive salary of faculty B, still allowing faculty B to attract the new
7Before proceeding, however, we note that the implications of the second case on the analysis in this
section are quite straightforward (the results in all other sections remain unchanged): If faculty A is less
restrictive than faculty B (sA;min  sB;min), a candidate will enter faculty A independent of his own status
sC because A is, for any given wage level WB, more attractive for the candidate and more willing to accept
new members than faculty B. Hence, if   ~ , no candidate will join faculty B.
10candidate, is given by:
W
+









where  is the smallest feasible monetary unit. Furthermore, we dene the minimum salary
oered by faculty A that lets the candidate's IC hold if faculty B oers the candidate its
entire hiring budget,  B, as wage:
~ WA   B   (^ sA   ^ sB):
We prove in the appendix:




^ sj 8j. The subgame-
perfect equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
(i) Region IV: A candidate with very low status, sC < sB;min(W E
B ); does not get an acceptable
oer from either faculty.
(ii) Region III: A candidate with low status level, sC 2 [sB;min(W E
B );sA;min(W E
B )); only gets
an acceptable oer from faculty B, which he accepts. WB = W E
B .
(iii) Region II: A candidate with medium status level, sC 2 [sA;min(W E
B );sA;min(WB =  B)),
receives acceptable oers from both faculties. He joins faculty B for a wage WB = W
+
B.
(iv) Region I: A candidate with high status level, sC  sA;min(WB =  B), receives acceptable
oers from both faculties. He joins faculty A for a wage of WA = ~ WA.
(v) The faculty losing the competition for the candidate in a region oers a wage as compet-
itive as possible (such that 
mj










^ sA , region III also does not exist. As these two cases do not aect our main
positive insights, namely that some candidates enter faculty A for this wage whereas others
enter faculty B for that wage, we will analyze the full spectrum of regions as characterized
in Proposition 1.
Figures 1 (delineating the allocation of entrants to faculties) and 2 (plotting the wage
paid by the \winning" faculty) illustrate Proposition 1.
In region IV, there is no wage level that satises a candidate's participation constraint
and produces a nonnegative utility dierential for the median member mB (let alone mA).
Thus, candidates in this region stay with their outside option. For candidates in region III,
faculty B is protected from competition of faculty A as the median voter of faculty A would
only want to compete for the candidate if the wage expenses are quite low. This would,
however, violate (PCA). In region I, on the other hand, faculty A is protected from intense
competition. Because of its budget constraint,  B, faculty B is not able to oer a high status








No faculty; Region IV
Faculty B; Region III
Faculty B; Region II
Faculty A; Region I
Figure 1: Stratied segmentation of candidates in faculties A and B
A's. In region II, competition for the candidate is most intense: no faculty is protected from
competitive bids of the other faculty. Due to the impact of WB on sA;min, however, faculty
B can oer a wage, W
+
B, that is suciently attractive for the candidate such that an equally
attractive wage of faculty A would turn the utility dierential of A's median member slightly
negative. Consequently, the candidate will enter club B.
The intuition of Proposition 1.(v) is that the \losing" faculty j neither has an incentive
to bid a higher wage than the most competitive wage (as it would violate sj;min and make

mj
j < 0) nor to ask for a lower wage (this would make membership in faculty j even less
attractive for the candidate and would not change mj's surplus of zero). Given this strategy
of the losing faculty, the \winning" faculty's best response, according to the arguments above,
is to oer W E
B , W
+
B and ~ WA in the respective regions III to I.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 1 we have the following:
Corollary 1 (Wage levels) In equilibrium the highest ranking candidates (in region I) re-
ceive lower wages than some candidates with relatively lower status (the best in region II).
In other words, top ranking researchers prefer to join a top ranking faculty for com-
paratively low remuneration, whereas some researchers with lower status join lower ranking
faculties for a comparatively high salary. Figure 2 visualizes this idea.8
8Note that in gure 2 we plotted equilibrium wages of the winning faculty for ^ sA < 2^ sB +  B   R. If this
inequality did not hold, we would have WE
B  ~ WA. In region II, W
+
B would adjust accordingly, starting from
the low level of WE
B at sA;min(WE
B ) and increasing linearly to a value of  B at sA;min(WB =  B).
12sB;min(W E
B ) sA;min(W E
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Figure 2: Wage paid by the \winning" faculty
5 The allocation of surplus and the pivotal member
5.1 The allocation of surplus under majority voting
To enable us comparing the impact of the decision-making rules applied in the faculties on
the competitive outcome, we will follow a two step procedure. First, we analyze the division
of the surplus that is created by entry of a candidate between the three key players in the
majority voting case: the median members of faculties A and B and the candidate. Second,
given a faculty gains the candidate as new member, we analyze the distribution of surplus
within this faculty.
Equation (1) states that, without entry of a candidate, the median member of faculty j
obtains a utility level of ^ s
mj
j +   B=Nj. The candidate gets his outside option, R. (7) and
(8) capture the utility dierentials of the three key players conditional on the event that
the candidate enters a faculty, which is compared to their outside options without entry.
Henceforth, we will use the terms utility dierential and surplus exchangeably.
By denition, the utility dierential of the \losing" median member, who does not get a
new fellow member, is 
mj
j = 0. The utility dierential of the \winning" median member,
whose faculty employs the candidate as a new member in equilibrium, is given by (8) but
depends on the equilibrium wage. We prove the following Lemma in the appendix.
Lemma 3 (Surplus division between the key players under majority voting) (i): In
Region IV, the surplus of all three key players is zero. (ii): In Region III, only the median
member of faculty B enjoys positive surplus, which is increasing in the status of the candi-
date. (iii): In Region II, only the candidate gains positive surplus, which is increasing in
his own status. (iv): In Region I, both the candidate and the median member of faculty A
13receive positive surplus, given R is suciently low, but only the median member's surplus
increases in the candidate's status.
Lemma 3 reects again the varying degree of competition among the two faculties in the
respective regions allowing faculty B (A) to achieve a positive surplus in region III (I). The
fact that the two faculties are protected from competition in these two regions implies that
they can grasp the entire increasing total welfare which arises if candidates with increasing
status enter. In region II, in which competition is intense it is the candidate who can collect
the entire surplus. In addition it shows that, depending on the status of the candidate, each
key player can yield a positive surplus from entry.
Now we are turning to the question, how is the surplus that is generated via entry of a
candidate distributed within a faculty? To answer this question we rst need to dene the
aggregate surplus of the \winning" faculty, which employs the candidate as a new member.







C   ^ sj   Wj: (19)
In the following Lemma, which is proven in the Appendix, we only state the surplus of
the winning faculty in each region. By denition, the surplus of the losing faculty is zero.
The surplus of the candidate is given by Lemma 3. In region IV, there is no winning faculty.
Lemma 4 (Aggregate surplus of the winning faculty under majority voting) At the
lower bound of a region, the surplus of the winning faculty (j) is:
^ s
mj
j   ^ sj:
The aggregate surplus of the winning faculty increases in region III (for faculty B) and in
region I (for A) with sC whereas it stays constant in sC in region II.
Lemmas 3 and 4 put us in a situation where we can compare the surplus of the median
voter of the winning faculty with the aggregate surplus of his faculty.
At the lower bound of each region, the median member of the winning faculty j receives
zero surplus, while the aggregate surplus of his faculty is j = ^ s
mj
j   ^ sj. If this expression is
positive, it implies that a candidate with a status level marginally below the lower bound of
the region is not admitted to the faculty at all or, at least, not admitted for the wage paid
in the equilibrium of the region; see Proposition 1. However, from the aggregate member
perspective, it would have been benecial to admit the candidate for the equilibrium wage,
that is it would have been benecial to lower sj;min. It follows that, in this case, the median
member of the winning faculty implemented an access policy that is too restrictive.
In turn, if j = ^ s
mj
j   ^ sj is negative, it implies that a candidate with a status level equal
to the lower bound of the region is admitted to the faculty for the equilibrium wage of that
14region. However, from the aggregate member perspective, it would have been benecial not
to admit the candidate for the equilibrium wage, that is it would have been benecial to
increase sj;min. Hence, in this case, the median member of the winning faculty implemented
an access policy that is too liberal.
Let us interpret lowering the minimum status requirement of a faculty as an investment
in new members. Based on the above discussion we can state the following Lemma without
a formal proof.
Lemma 5 (Positive and negative externalities in admitting candidates) If ^ s
mj
j >
(<)^ sj, there is a positive (negative) externality from the median member of the winning
faculty to the aggregate of his fellows, which results in underinvestment (overinvestment) in
new faculty members.
Lemma 5 points on two important determinants for the aggregate surplus of the winning
faculty: the frequency distribution of status levels in the faculty, that is whether ^ s
mj
j is larger
or smaller than ^ sj, and the identity of the pivotal faculty member.
In the remainder of this article we will analyze the second determinant in more detail.
We will show how the status rank of the pivotal member, who is determined by a certain
decision-making rule within the faculty, inuences the competitive equilibrium outcome and
hence the aggregate surplus of the existing faculty members.
5.2 The generalized pivotal member model
We now generalize our main set-up by extending our approach by allowing for a pivotal
voter who is dierent from the one with median status. The exact nature of the pivotal
voter depends on the governance structure or decision-making rule chosen by the faculties.
We defer the general analysis of our game, depending on ^ sP
j , the status enjoyed by the pivotal
member of faculty j, to Appendix A.4 as it resembles the analysis of the majority voting
case to a large extent. Here we only report the most important dierences to the baseline
model and a key result leading to new insights.
Related to the baseline model we consider the case where:
 < minf1;
^ sP
A   ^ sP
B
^ sA   ^ sB
g: (20)
It is important to understand that, in a world where decision-making rules in the two
faculties may dier, there are several cases where this inequality does not hold. For instance,
if ^ sP
A is small and ^ sP
B is large, that is if the pivotal member in faculty A has a relatively high
status sP
A and the pivotal member in B has a relatively low status sP
B, (20) may not hold.
This may occur if, for instance, faculty A assigns decision-making power to its member with
highest status, whereas faculty B gives every member veto rights and, hence, makes its lowest
15ranking member pivotal. In this case, regions III and IV characterized in Proposition 1 may
not exist.
To cover the full spectrum of our previous analysis, however, we assume for the remainder
of the analysis that all regions exist in equilibrium, that is that (20) holds. This assumption
covers many status distributions and decision-making rules in the two faculties. We show in
Appendix A.4 that the following version of Lemma 5 is correct.
Lemma 6 (Externalities in the pivotal member model) From the joint perspective of
all members of a faculty, (i): if ^ sP
j > ^ sj, due to a positive externality the pivotal member is
too restrictive and, hence, underinvests in new faculty members. (ii): If ^ sP
j < ^ sj, due to a
negative externality the pivotal member is too liberal and overinvests in new faculty members.
According to (8), k
j increases strictly monotonically in sk, the status rank of member k.
Hence, P
j is strictly monotonic in sP
j , the status rank of the pivotal member in faculty j.
Taking this together with Lemma 6 allows us to establish the following Proposition without
formal proof.
Proposition 2 (Optimal status rank of the pivotal member) (i): The aggregate sur-
plus of the winning faculty in a region, j(sP
j ), increases in the status rank of the pivotal
member, sP
j , if sP
j < ^ sj. j(sP
j ) decreases in sP
j if sP
j > ^ sj. (ii): j(sP
j ) has a well-dened
and unique maximum at sP
j = ^ sj.
Given that, according to Lemma 4, a faculty can only expect a positive surplus as a whole
if it wins the competition for the candidate, Proposition 2 contains the main normative result
of this paper. It implies that the total surplus of a faculty, conditional on attracting the
candidate as a new member, has a well-dened maximum in the domain of status levels of
its existing members. This maximum is located at the average status level of a faculty, ^ sj.
Because of the strict monotonicity of P
j (sP
j ) in sP
j , it is unique.
If the decision-making rule in a faculty makes a member with a more extreme status level
pivotal, most of his fellow members suer from a positive or negative externality. Specically,
if the status level of the pivotal member is lower than the faculty's average status, he will
be too restrictive and prevent that candidates with certain status levels enter the faculty,
although this would be benecial for the faculty as a whole. In turn, if the status level of
the pivotal member is higher than the faculty's average status, he will be too liberal and
permit entry of some candidates whose status level is so low that the faculty as a whole loses
more than it gains. If a member with average status level is made pivotal, the two types of
externalities just level out.
165.3 Policy implications of the pivotal member model
The previous analysis, in particular Proposition 2, leads to several clear-cut normative im-
plications. First, from the perspective of the existing members of an academic faculty, a
decision-making rule or governance structure should be implemented that assigns de facto
authority over hiring decisions to the faculty member with average status. In a frictionless
world, this objective could be implemented via a regime of unanimity voting with side-
payments, for instance. This means that every faculty member obtains the right to veto
entry of a candidate but that side-payments among the faculty members are possible (and
members have the liquidity to pay them). For a given status level of the candidate, sC, all
existing members who would receive a positive surplus from entry (high status members)
would have an incentive to make side-payments to their fellows with negative utility dier-
ential (low status members). Then, by the denition of j, gains and losses within a faculty
would level out and every member would have the same net surplus after side-payments were
made. By this procedure, the minimum status requirement of the entire faculty would equal
the one set by the member with average status.
In practice, however, the world is only rarely frictionless and the Coase Theorem does
not always hold. Those frictions could arise from bargaining costs during specifying side-
payments, university regulations curbing side-payments, or transaction costs in general. In
such a second-best world, given that the frequency distribution of status levels within a
faculty is not too skewed, it may be benecial to establish a majority voting rule. As
demonstrated in the baseline model, under this governance structure the median member
is pivotal. For many status distributions, the dierence between the utility enjoyed by the
median member, ^ s
mj
j , and the utility enjoyed by the (hypothetical) average member, ^ sj, is
not large. Furthermore, majority voting is frequently used in practice and relatively easy
to implement. More specically, we show in the appendix that the following Proposition is
true.
Proposition 3 (Dominance of Majority Voting) Majority voting produces a (weakly)
higher surplus for the existing faculty members as a whole than any governance structure
that makes members with extreme status values pivotal.
This Proposition implies that, irrespective of the status frequency distributions in facul-
ties, majority voting is (weakly) preferable to unanimity voting without side-payments, where
the lowest ranking member is in control, or to meritocracy, where the highest ranking mem-
ber can make decisions. Due to this characteristic and its simplicity, we perceive majority
voting to be an attractive governance structure for faculty members in all settings where the
transaction costs of more complicated regimes are high.
If those costs are low, however, in some cases of skewed status frequency distributions, it
is feasible to adjust the gap ^ sP
j   ^ sj via applying a more complicated decision-making rule
17that requires a certain percentage x of members to accept a candidate as faculty member
(qualied majority voting). It would be important to bear in mind that the existing member
with highest status is the one who will agree rst to admitting a candidate, given a certain
wage oered, followed by the one with second highest status, and so on.
On the candidate side our analysis has two implications. First, given candidates have a
choice (which we have not modeled), they prefer to apply for research jobs where competition
between faculties is most intense. The reason is that there competition pushes up the wage
level and candidates benet proportionally from a marginal increase in own status (cf. region
II). Second, ceteris paribus candidates prefer faculties where an existing member with high
status is pivotal. Those members benet relatively more from the status of a new member
and, thus, are willing to pay a higher wage than existing members with lower status.
6 Discussion and robustness
We will focus in this section on what we consider the main assumptions of our setup and its
conclusions.
The main mechanism in our analysis hinges on the fact that faculty members with higher
status gain relatively more from a new member than existing members with a lower status.
Technically, this stems from the fact that faculty members benet from the average status
of their fellow members (excluding their own) independent of the specic form of the utility
function. The fact that existing members with lower status gain less than existing members
with higher status depicts the fact that, in case of entry, they have to share the possibility
to interact with higher status members with more fellows (dilution eect). In contrast,
high status members gain relatively less from social interaction. They benet more from
faculty facilities etc., that is from the monetary contribution of the new member. Given
that we consider faculties as status organizations, in which social interaction matters and in
which social status is vertically dierentiated, this is a quite natural and general mechanism.
Moreover, the dilution eect is most prevalent with a rather small number of faculty members
and is mitigated as the faculty size increases. Therefore, we consider our main mechanism
to be robust as long as we do not study faculties that are very large and as long as we accept
the notion of status being a vertically dierentiated value.
Second, we consider in the main body of our analysis a one-shot game. If we extend it to
a repeated game setting, the results will depend on the shape of the ex ante and the ex post
(after entry took place once) frequency distributions of members in both faculties. What is
important for our analysis is the insight that our results are robust in each stage of the game
as long as it complies with our parameter setting in Lemma 2.(i).
Third, we have modeled competition for a new candidate in a two-faculty framework. Are
our results robust to an extension to many faculties? Consider the case in which the status of
18a new candidate is drawn from a distribution over [x;  x], where x << s and  x >>  s. Assume
that, out of many vertically stratied faculties, we focus on faculties Z, A, and B, where
faculty Z has a higher average status than faculty A, which has a higher average status than
B. Assumption (4) holds respectively. When determining the entry regions as in Proposition
1, the threshold level between faculties A and B remains sA;min(WB =  B). However, in
this setting faculty A also faces competition from the higher status faculty Z. Taking the
intuition of Lemma 2, faculty A has incentives to oer a higher wage than faculty Z to any new
candidate, until its budget constraint becomes binding, at  B. We conclude that we can expect
entry in faculty A for all new candidates with sC 2 [sA;min(WB =  B);sZ;min(WA =  B)], where
sA;min(WB =  B) = ^ s
mA
A   (^ sA   ^ sB) +   B and sZ;min(WB =  B) = ^ s
mZ
Z   (^ sZ   ^ sA) +   B.




Z   ^ s
mA
A
^ sZ + ^ sB   2^ sA
: (21)
Then each faculty has a positive probability of gaining the candidate as new member in
equilibrium. Wages are determined according to the result of region II, the most competitive
region in our basic setting.
Fourth, let us discuss the symmetry of the utility functions of all players (existing mem-
bers of both faculties as well as the candidate), which our results crucially depend on. Our
model implies that the marginal rate of substitution between status (or utility from joint
research) and monetary transfers (or teaching load reduction) is identical for all agents. A
relaxation of this assumption has potentially strong, but in most cases quite obvious impli-
cations. The most interesting application is when the new candidate values status less than
money. In this case, the competitive advantage of faculty A decreases. The dierence in
wages becomes more important. This eect becomes most obvious if the candidate is only
interested in wage. A new entrant with high status is relatively more attractive for faculty
B than for faculty A (since the eect on average status is more pronounced for faculty B).
Hence, faculty B is able and willing to attract high status candidates. A potentially rele-
vant application of this may be if highly reputable professors prefer second-tier universities,
thereby making more money than by joining a top-university. Since there are no obvious
justications of systematic dierences in preferences, we stick to our symmetry assumption
in the main body of the analysis.
A related issue is our assumption on the existence of a budget constraint,  B. The driving
force of our analysis is the trade-o between utility from status and from money. As long
as there is any budget constraint for the two faculties (allowing for non-existence of budget
constraints obviously is little convincing), the quality of our results remains intact. If we
start from our initial assumption and relax budget constraints, faculty B can compete more
ercely with faculty A in monetary terms, that is it can oer a higher wage. This change
leads to the shrinking of region I but it leaves all other results intact.
197 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the impact that certain decision-making rules or gover-
nance structures in academic faculties, where the members may decide about hiring new
members, have on the competitive outcome of the labor market for new researchers. The
main novel assumption of our model is that faculties are status organizations, where a mem-
ber's utility depends on the average research capability of his fellow members. Thus, utility
from faculty membership is dierent among all members, unless they have the same status.
This insight leads to interesting implications for the role of dierent governance structures
that make this member or that member pivotal in a certain decision-making process.
Our main positive result shows that high status candidates join the higher ranking faculty
but for a medium wage, whereas lower ranking candidates join the lower ranking faculty.
Interestingly, the best candidates joining the lower ranking faculty receive higher wages than
the candidates joining the better faculty. These results are testable empirically.
Our main normative result is that the aggregate surplus of a faculty is maximized if a
decision-making rule is employed that makes the average faculty member pivotal. This is due
to positive and negative externalities that make decisions by members with more extreme
preferences, such as the lowest ranking or the highest ranking member, detrimental to most
of their fellows.
As in practice information asymmetries and transaction costs may make it a non-trivial
task to nd a governance structure that makes the average member pivotal, we perceive the
majority voting rule as a second-best alternative for most faculties. The reason is that, as
long as the status frequency distribution in a faculty is not too skewed, the median member's
preferences, who is made pivotal under majority voting, are not too far from the average
member's.
This insight implies both our main policy implication and a testable empirical hypothesis:
As faculties benet, on a cooperative basis, from avoiding extreme decision making rules,
we expect to observe trends towards majority voting. As, for instance, many academic
faculties in Europe are governed in a consensus-based way, we expect them to liberalize their
decision-making processes over time.
Our model applies to a wide range of potential applications beyond our particular ex-
ample of academic institutions. The dening characteristics are: rst, the organizations are
member-owned, that is the existing members possess the decision rights and they can enjoy
the budget not used for hiring. Second, the organizations get a xed budget assigned by some
authority but in exchange the authority can determine rules that prohibit that members take
out the budget as a dividend. This explains the discount factor  < 1. Third, members'
utility depends on the status positions of their fellow members. These assumptions are typi-
cally met by clubs with a vertically structured status variable such as country clubs, internet
20clubs, conference organizations etc. In contrast, our model cannot be applied without adap-
tations to clubs with a multi-dimensional status variable, where members' preferences are
not single-peaked.9
There are a number of potential avenues for extensions. First, endogenizing the decisions
of university executive boards, who determine the hiring budget in our model but may also
be in charge for determining a governance structure at the faculty level, would be reward-
ing. Second, we have assumed in this rst model of its kind that status is a unidimensional
vertically dierentiable variable. Relaxing this assumption by allowing both faculties and
candidates to also position in a horizontal dimension may trigger interesting strategic inter-
actions. Third, analyzing the implications of competition among investor-owned clubs (such
as some professional sports clubs) would be a straightforward and particularly interesting
extension. As a rst step in this direction it would be crucial to dene the objective function
of such an organization.
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22A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i): Because of Lemma 2.(i), the cut-o status level below which candidates do not get an
acceptable oer from any faculty is determined by faculty B. W E
B denotes the salary for which
(PCB) of the entrant just holds with equality. As sB;min is increasing in WB, sB;min(W E
B ) is
the lowest status level where faculty B makes an oer that meets (PCB).
(ii): By denition of sA;min, in the range sC 2 [sB;min(W E
B );sA;min(W E
B )) faculty A is not
able to make a membership oer to the candidate that satises both parties (independently
of faculty B's behavior). Therefore, faculty B is able to exploit the candidate completely,
which means to set WB = W E
B .
(iii): For sC  sA;min(W E
B ), demanding WB = W E
B has the consequence that faculty A
has an incentive to match the oer of faculty B. The candidate would then join faculty A.
In the range sC 2 [sA;min(W E
B );sA;min(WB =  B)), however, faculty B can make sure that
sA;min(WB) > sC > sB;min(WB): Thus, faculty A has no incentive to oer the candidate entry
with a salary that would both meet (PCA) and make him prefer membership in faculty A
over faculty B. Because of the second part of this inequality, faculty B still has this incentive,
though. As an increase in wages increases sA;min and sB;min by the same factor,  (see (16)
and (17)), B can sustain this behavior in the entire region II. By using (16) we can nd W
+
B
as dened above, whereby  denotes a very small number and (@W
+
B)=(@sC) > 0: Hence,
an entrant with sC very close to sA;min(BB =  B) receives almost the maximum wage that
faculty B can pay from its budget.
(iv): Because of the budget constraint of faculty B, WB cannot be increased indenitely.
Hence, faculty B has no tool to prevent faculty A from making candidates with sC 
sA;min(BB =  B) an oer that benets both of them. Faculty A can let the indierence
condition (and the participation constraint) of the candidate hold. Comparing (9) and
(11) reveals that, from the point of view of faculty A, (11) is (weakly) more restrictive if
WB  R   ^ sB, that is if (PCB) holds. This condition holds 8sC  sB;min(W E
B ), that is
in regions III, II, and I. This result implies that, if faculty A oers a wage in region I for
which the indierence condition holds, the participation constraint holds, too. Thus, faculty
A oers a wage level that is equal to the dierence of the average status levels between the
two faculties from the point of view of the entrant. This consideration yields WA = ~ WA.
(v): The faculty losing the competition for the candidate (both faculties in region IV, faculty
A in regions III and II, faculty B in region I) gets a surplus of zero, no matter which (ratio-
nal) strategy it employs. If it plays the most competitive strategy and oers a (sj;min;Wj)-
combination such that 
mj
j = 0, it still has no incentives to deviate. However, it ensures
that the actions characterized in parts (i)-(iv) of the Proposition are incentive-compatible.
23Q:E:D:
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3




B = C = 0.
In region III, the candidate chooses to join faculty B but will not get any surplus from
entry as W E
B just pays him his reservation value: C = 
mA





NB(sC   ^ s
mB
B  (R   ^ sB)). By denition of sB;min(W E
B ), this expression is zero at its lower
bound. It is increasing in sC.
In region II, the candidate also joins faculty B. Hence, 
mA








NB(sC   ^ s
mB





 + )). Note that sC cancels from




B) = 0 at its lower bound, which does not change
over the course of region II because it is constant in sC. In contrast, the candidate benets




 +^ sA+ R: This dierential is zero at its lower
bound, sA;min(W E
B ), and grows linearly with increasing sC.
In region I, the candidate joins faculty A. Thus, 
mB




NA(sC   ^ s
mA
A   (  B   (^ sA   ^ sB))). This expression is zero at its lower
bound, sA;min(WB =  B), and increases in sC. The candidate receives a utility dierential of
C =  B + ^ sB   R, which is positive for suciently low R and constant in sC. Q:E:D:
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
In region III, B = sC   (1   )^ sB   R, which is increasing in sC. By denition of
sB;min(W E
B ), the status level of an admitted candidate in region III is at least sC = ^ s
mB
B +
(R   ^ sB). Substituting this into B yields B
 





B   ^ sB in case of
the lowest ranked admitted candidate. Depending on the ex ante frequency distribution of
status in faculty B, this can be positive or negative.
In region II, substituting W
+
B in (19) yields B = ^ s
mA
A  ^ sA (1 )^ sB . In case of the
lowest ranked candidate admitted in region II, this yields B(sC = sB;min(W
+
B)) = ^ s
mB
B  ^ sB.
Just as in region III, this can be positive or negative. In contrast to region III, B is not
increasing in sC.
In region I, substituting ~ WA in (19) yields A = sC   (1   )^ sA   ^ sB     B, which is
increasing in sC. In case of the lowest ranked candidate admitted in region I, this yields
A(sC = sA;min(WB =  B)) = ^ s
mA
A   ^ sA. Depending on the ex ante frequency distribution of
status in faculty A, this can be positive or negative. Q:E:D:
24A.4 The pivotal member model in a nutshell
The pivotal member P maximizes P
j instead of 
mj
j ; see (12). The side-constraints are the
same as in the majority voting case. Thus, the minimum status requirements set by pivotal
members in faculties A and B are:
s
P
A;min(WB) = ^ s
P
A   (^ sA   ^ sB) + WB (22)
s
P
B;min(WB) = ^ s
P
B + WB: (23)
These minimum status levels increase in ^ sP
j . Drawing on Lemma 1, they decrease in sP
j ,
the own status level of a pivotal member. Hence, the higher is the status rank of the pivotal
member of faculty j, the lower is the minimum status requirement for new entrants in j.




^ sA ^ sBg, related to Lemma 2.(i) and the main
part of our baseline model. It follows that sP
A;min(WB) > sP
B;min(WB). This is the key
expression that allows us to use the subgame-perfect equilibrium characterized in Proposition
1 with only mild adaptations. As long as  <
^ sP
j  s
^ sj 8j, this Proposition holds, where W E
B
and ~ WA are equal to the baseline model, whereas W
+P




 + . The
latter expression implies that the equilibrium wage of candidates in region II increases in the
status rank of the winning faculty's pivotal member.
In contrast, an important dierence between the baseline model and the generalized model




^ sA ^ sB. Then it follows that sP
A;min(WB)  sP
B;min(WB).
Thus, it is possible that some regions do not exist in equilibrium.
Consequently, the division of total surplus as in the baseline model depends on the
existence of the region in which a party makes positive surplus. According to Lemma 3, this
means that faculty B has to make sure that region III exists, while faculty A depends on
region I for making positive surplus. Apart from the limit cases, the candidate gains surplus
in both regions II and I.
For conclusiveness, we assume for the remainder of the analysis that all regions exist in
equilibrium. In this case, the division of surplus between the three key players depicted in
Lemma 3 is not changed in qualitative terms. We just have to switch the wording in Lemma
3 from \median member" to \pivotal member". Lemma 4 has to be adjusted because the
boundaries of the regions depend on the status values of the pivotal members. Hence, at the


































A   ^ sA:
By the same reasoning as used in Lemma 5 we can state Lemma 6.
25A.5 Proof of Proposition 3









 nj   s
mj; (24)





















 nj < ^ s
mj (28)
In order to prove the Proposition for the case that the pivotal voter is the faculty member
with the highest status, building on Proposition 2, we have to show that:10
j^ s
 nj   ^ sjj  j^ s
mj   ^ sjj (29)
We prove by contradication. We claim the contrary of (29):
j^ s
 nj   ^ sjj < j^ s
mj   ^ sjj (30)
(30) can only hold if either:
(i) ^ sj < ^ s
 nj < ^ s
mj (31)
(ii) ^ s nj < ^ sj < ^ s
mj (32)
holds.
From (31) it follows that:








 i si + smj
Nj   1
(34)







10For the case in which the pivotal voter is the one with the lowest status, the prove can be conducted in
a similar fashion.






i = Nj^ sj; (36)
which is false as long as at least one member has a status values less than the top member.
Hence, the rst part of our initial claim in (30) is contradicted.
As a next step we address case (ii): from (32) it follows that:
^ sj   ^ s
 nj < ^ s
mj   ^ sj (37)
, 2
P








 i si + smj
Nj   1
(38)





















 nj)  2Nj^ sj (40)
Note that (40) implies that the following is analogous to (37):
s
mj + s
 nj < 2^ sj (41)






Nj and due to the denition of the median, it is most
likely that (41) holds if (i): smj = snj and (ii): ^ sj(smj = snj) is maximal. By denition of
the average, the maximum of ^ sj(smj = snj) is reached if all status values above the median
have the top status value, s nj, and all status values below and including the median have











nj if Nj is odd-numbered. (42)
If Nj is even-numbered, this maximum is lower.













 nj   s
nj < 0; (44)
which is in contradiction to our status value denitions. It follows that (32) never holds.
Hence, the second part of (30) is contradicted as well, thereby proving Proposition 3. Q:E:D:
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